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AbBiract of Theaia 
The British Army of the 1820's was not trained fa- counter-insurgency 
duties to operate in small detached parties. Their role in the campaign 
against the Abaigines was to aid the civil power, and tensions and 
inefficiencies resulted when troops were drected and commanded by 
civilians. The colonial garrison was commanded by an experienced 
soldier and administrator, lieutenant-Governor George Arthur. He 
exercised a ci.lal civiUmilit.-y function enSlling an resources were 
integ-ated th-ou~ an administrative system centred on his police 
districts. By 1830, Arthur sought a solution to the Aboriginal problem 
based on a dual strategy of conciliation in the tribal lands, and use of 
military force, to expel the natives from the settled areas. 
The Abaigines developed fa-midable skills as guerilla fi~ters, and 
their tactics took advantage of their enemies' weapons limitations. With 
loss of tradtional hunting g-ounds, the Aborigines were forced to rely on 
raiding settlers' huts for supplies. This generated stronger counter-
measures, such as m.-tial law in 1828 and the Black Une in 1830, which 
was the dimax of the counter-insurgency campaigt. This was a sweep 
and ca-don operation, combining troops, and civilians who were called 
out under a levy en masse, under Army command. The troops, now 
under command of their own officers, were disciplined and efficient. 
Opinions differ in contemporary and historical writings, concerning the 
iii 
Black Une, as to whether it was a Tiasco' or, in terms of Arttu.-·s dual 
strategy, a success. As he dd not achieve his military aim to confine the 
Abarigines in Tasman's Peninsula, the Une was a fail...-e, but due to 
Walpole's contact, it was not a total failu-e, and as it was meticulously 
planned and executed, the term Tiasco' is inappropriate. As the Une 
di"ectly asaisted the conciliatory arm of the dual strategy, it con1ributed to 
Arthur'slong term goal. 
Almost a mythology has developed over aspects of the Une. Arthu-
dstorted fact in insisting that Walpole's contact, and the presence of 
convicts with the Abaigines, led to the failu-e of his military obiective. 
Without recognising the temper of the times, and that the Line was 
Arthtl"'s only remaining military option, the 'fiasco' school of 'Writers has 
unfairly tnnded the Black Une as a foolish enterprise. Historians' 
statements of numbers deployed on the line wry considerably, a miner, 
but pertinent example of how an error can develop by unaitical 
acceptance of one primary sot.l"ce. 
The counter-in&U"gency campaigt in the police dis1ricts and on the 
Black. Line, while being a minor footnote in the annals of the British Army, 
is a sig~ificant but often misunderstood or forgotten phase of Tasmanian 
history. It deserves more recognition by Tasmanian and Australian 
military historians. 
